Security issue in Terminal

[Guido Berhoerster]

* Kevin Chadwick <ma1l1ists at yahoo.co.uk> [2012-03-08 12:50]:
> On Wed, 7 Mar 2012 23:49:45 +0100
> Guido Berhoerster wrote:
> 
> > Switching to xterm will not gain you any additional security as
> > the scrollback memory can be swapped out and thus end up on disk,
> > too. If you deal with any sensitive documents where that becomes
> > an issue you need to encrypt your filesystems, everything else is
> > just eyewash and pseudosecurity.
> 
> You mean encrypting your swap will help a little but is in fact less
> secure than xterm using memory if you turn the power off at the plug
> when you shutdown. Sensitive stuff shouldn't be echoed anyway but that
> is no excuse for this bug which may reduce permissions to world
> readable for example.

I'm not sure I understand what you're trying to say here. The
original report basically complains that terminal involving
sensitive data can end up on disk, it is not about information
disclosure through world readable files.
So even if you use xterm, the xterm scrollback memory may be
swapped out and end up on disk as well. Encrypting swap may
mitigate this particular issue but even then there are many
different ways how accessed data may end up somewhere on disk.
The only viable solution to prevent sensitive data from being
stored in clear on disk is to use full disk encryption. And even
then your system might still be susceptible to cold boot attacks,
turning off the power and pulling the plug won't protect you from
that either.
-- 
Guido Berhoerster